Baffled by the sluggish rate of NATO bombing of Gaddafi’s forces in Libya, and the fact that this business is dragging on so inconclusively?

Read this fine piece by Stephen Saideman at McGill University on the underlying negotiation going on. Really, I could not have it better myself.

Thus:

Simply put, in the aftermath of the Cold War, conquest may appear to be easy, taking a few days or weeks when a superior opponent faces a weaker one, but compelling a leader to give up something of significant value is actually more difficult. 

Why?  Because coercive diplomacy in this way is bargaining (a la Thomas Schelling), and if you make extreme demands, such as surrendering territory or political office, then the other side is not going to give up easily.  This is especially true when the one making the threats is a coalition of the ambivalent.  Using limited means inherently signals limited commitment and a relatively weak bargaining position. 

This means that the opponent, Milosevic then and Qaddafi now, can try to play for time and hope that the international coalition breaks down.

Precisely.

By going for high-level and almost risk-free bombing raids rather than flattening Gaddafi and his close relatives immediately, the coalition of NATO forces involved sends a signal both to Gaddafi and to the rebels that … they are sending a signal, not trying to ‘win’ outright:

"Yes, we’re in this, but only up to a point. Still, once we’re in, we’re in. Best if you o Gaddafi take the hint and step down, nicely."

And look at this superb passage which explains why democracies are doomed to be at best only partially efficient in such cases:

… as the conflict continues, the stakes will increase, just as they did in Kosovo, to include NATO’s reputation and the desire to see it not fail.  My best guess is that NATO will continue in the effort, the Americans will reinvest to prevent its failure, and those around Qaddafi will start to realize that the international community will not go away. 

This does not mean a quick, easy resolution, but rather exactly the opposite.  The funny thing is that if we had reasonable expectations about a longer campaign, and prepared accordingly, the alliance might have had more leverage, and we might have actually seen a shorter effort. 

But that isn’t the way these things play out. Politicians tell themselves and their supporters that an intervention will not be expensive or long, and thus produce less commitment up front.

Indeed. Diplomatic negotiation is all about lots of things simultaneously:

  • exertable power
  • credibility – are your threats believable for the other side?
  • willingness to inflict pain – and to sustain the pain for as long as it takes
  • willingness to tolerate pain – and to tolerate it for as long as it takes
  • who loses/wins what
  • what’s really at stake
  • who cares the most

Here Gaddafi cares a lot about Gaddafi and his rule. Because he cares, his ability to absorb pain (which falls mainly on other Libyans) appears to exceed (for now) NATO’s willingness to inflict it. Plus whereas NATO’s power is very powerful but operating from on high, his is disaggregated and operating from on low (sniper-rifles, ad hoc attacks on rebel forces or their water supplies).  

See also this earlier posting about other diplomatic negotiations:

All this helps explain why the EU works the way it does. You have Power only if you can block. Hence readiness to have Voting on ever more issues rather than Consensus, "to get things done".

See also the Mother of All Blockings, the right of veto for the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. Once that right is there it does not need to be used often. As Nimzowitsch (maybe) said, "the threat is stronger than the execution."

Whatever. It boils down to a simple proposition.

How bloody-minded are you ready to be to get what you want, via negotiation or otherwise?

If the answer is ‘not very’, do not be surprised if others more bloody-minded than you get more of what they want – at your expense.

See France and Greece in the EU, passim.

Basically, NATO doesn’t care much about Gaddafi or Libya, or at least not enough to deliver a ruthless knock-out blow. So it all drags on, with Libyan civilians so much collateral damage – neither side really cares that much about them.

As for the continuing brutalisation of Syrian civilians? The world mulls it over and comes to a firm, more or less united conclusion. 

Forgeddit.