One of the many best things about writing this blog is that people I hardly know or may not have ever met get in touch in all sorts of ways.

Thus. Remember my piece a while back about the startling and startlingly bad film Battle of Warsaw 1920? A reader today got in touch about it and left an interesting comment:

I’ve also studied this period from the perspective of the Russian Civil War, and it even gets to the stage of being frustrating how many missed opportunities there were for a White/Nationalist/Allied/Anti-Communist victory against the Reds. The Army of Southern Russia under Denikin is a very interesting point – he stated his aim to be that of defeating the Reds and then reestablishing the Russian Empire, which was a key motivation for the Poles *not* to support him and secure a seperate peace. If some of the major White Russian leaders had been willing to accept the independence of nations such as Poland then a much stronger alliance could have been achieved.

Of course, the question in the event of a White Victory and restoration of at least part of Imperial Russia would be what it would have meant for World War 2? Would that conflict have occurred, and how would it have played out given a vastly changed situation and ideology in Eastern Europe?

Always a good question. What if?

Then this evening I heard from F Peter Phillips at the New York Law School who runs an excellent blog on Business Conflict. We met at the International Bar Association gathering in Vancouver in October 2010. I wrote about my presentation here:

The problem here and in many other negotiating contexts is that people are impatient: time is seen as scarce. Better a quick ‘good enough’ outcome than a more patient, better one

This is part of a wider key issue in all negotiation. Is it better to create complexity for your opponent, to give pause for thought, to generate a sense of uncertainty as to what the best outcome is? That may suggest using more time.

Or rather should you aim to create simplicity – ‘let’s face it, it all boils down to this’ – to strip away detail and instead try to focus both sides on what you think ‘really’ matters? Perhaps quicker?

It turns out that there are all sorts of processes going on inside different parts of our brains emphasising varying combinations of logical and emotional responses to what we see and hear. Clever negotiators can use that scientific information to evoke different responses in the opposite side.

Good stuff. At least some of the audience of lawyers from around the world who usually deal in commercial work seemed impressed by the breadth and insight of the team presentation…

It turns out that Mr Phillips himself wrote about our presentation on his blog, describing in no little detail the ideas we put forward about negotiating with pirates – and the many policy and practical and legal issues which such situations generate:

A sobering — even frightening — panel at the IBA’s Vancouver conference addressed negotiation in volatile, politically charged and dangerous circumstances — pushing the boundaries of mediation past the purely commercial, into a world where lives may depend on the skill and success of the negotiator or mediator.

Maritime pirates off Somalia, for example, do not rationally seek and underlying political or even monetary interests, and their behavior is not deliberative. Charles Crawford CMG reflected on his years of service in the UK Foreign Office and concluded that, in Somalia and in the Balkans, a terrorist’s irrationality is his strength. It’s like a bankrupt buying a suite at the Plaza, or a dog chasing a car: the pirate, the kidnapper and the terrorist seek to introduce chaos into order…

Read the whole thing, especially the "clarity and outlandishness" of the analysis given by top UK hostage negotiator Duncan Jarrett.

Readers! Always a pleasure to hear from most of you.