The British Government’s approach on the BAE/Saudi corruption problem (see below) in a deeper way is all about how a country pursues its interests.

Part of getting what you want is projecting a sense of Power and Purpose, so that when a negotiation starts others feel cowed by your self-confidence. You establish up-front a psychological initiative. You evince inexorable success.

It helps to be Powerful to start off with. US diplomats enter a room armed with self-belief, to the point sometimes of sheer obnoxiousness. But there is only one USA. The rest of us have to make do with more modest means. 

The Russians too are outstanding negotiators, but in a different sense. They are taught negotiating technique in a way which is quite foreign to British and European methods.

Russian diplomats’ First Rule of Negotiating is simple and profound: "Never move position, even when you agree with someone, without trying to extract something first."

This attitude gives them all sorts of advantages. Above all they usually convey the impression (a) that they are tough, and (b) that they move only on their terms. Plus they come over as (c) ready to take considerable pain in defending their principles, while (d) being ready, nay keen, to hit you harder (and if possible below the belt) than you hit them.

Which is why Russian diplomats are rarely kidnapped or humiliated. Even the dimmest terrorist out there knows that if he does something bad to the Russians, they will not hesitate to something Very Bad, and preferably very personal, to him – and his family. 

Our British problem is that we (maybe especially in the FCO?) in a baffling post-modern way are increasingly uncomfortable if not embarrassed with any talk of ‘power’ (theirs or ours). We seem to be drifting into a hazy miasma of collective ineffectualness. Psychological and practical ‘safety’ is all. Confrontation necessarily is aggressive (and therefore bad). Winning is undesirable if it means someone loses.

It is hard to know where all this rubbish comes from explicitly. Part of it is the fact that at the national level we find ourselves sucked in to a ‘European’ style of negotiating, a restless but incoherent striving for ‘middle ground’. The default instinct when confronted with a new demand is not to say loudly "get lost", but rather to sigh "oh dear, they want something again – what might we offer them this time?"

In short, we can come across not as Powerfully Purposeful, but Lamely Malleable. When in fact we aren’t, or at least do not need to be.

We automatically want to Get to Yes. But we are reluctant to Start With No. 

Above all, part of projecting Power lies in showing that you can take pain in severe quantities – and that you are ready to dish it out too. Because in the end you have leverage in a situation for only two reasons:

  • First, you can give the other side something they want and/or you can hurt them in a way which counts for them.
  • Second, they are persuaded that they are wasting their time if they try to hurt you.

Which brings us to the BAE/Saudi issue.

There is a case for a cynical, ‘pragmatic’ approach to the BAE/Saudi problem as currently pursued by HMG, focused very much on the tactical aspects of the immediate situation..

But there is I think a stronger strategic case for letting the corruption investigation go forward, even at the risk of British firms losing huge contracts and British citizens being killed by terrorism.

That option is striking because it shows that the UK is prepared to incur Pain to stand up for Principle. That as nothing else sends a powerful deterrent signal both on corruption and more widely : "Wo! Those Brits really mean it on corruption – don’t mess with them".

That message reverberates round the planet. And in the long run we’ll do better.