The point of the crushing and monumental brutality against Hama by the then Syrian leadership was to send a message to Islamic extremists:

Do not mess with us, and if you do we will respond with crushing and monumental brutality

Which has more or less worked quite well, as far as I can see: radical Islamists these days are much more active elsewhere.

This same attitude no doubt has influenced the Israeli approach to Hamas. Deliver a defeat heavy enough to catch their attention.

Hard to say how well that has worked. But one loud argument against it is that the Israeli action has of course massively boosted support for Hamas.

Or maybe not? Thus:

… clear military defeat is such an obvious setback that all but the most committed ideologues find it difficult to ignore or explain away.

The fall in Hamas’ popular support does not by itself justify Israel’s recent policies. But it does provide an important data point in the longstanding debate over the impact of military action on public support for terrorists. It turns out that you can cause that support to drop – if you win.

The problem is that to deal convincingly with extremely violent undemocratic people often requires extremely violent and even undemocratic methods. Not easy in a democracy.

Our old friend Negotiation:

… a good plan is to spell out unexpected costs to them of their success, and unexpected benefits to them of your own view prevailing.

A more ruthless strategy involves increasing their pain, one way or the other. But that works only if your willingness and ability to inflict pain exceeds the other side’s willingness to tolerate it.

As Syria showed its Muslim brothers and sisters, back in 1983.