All eyes on Tony Blair, now giving evidence.

A further couple of observations on the deep legal angles, drawing on my own conversations with someone very close to all this.

First, the legal arguments finally used by the Attorney General to justify the intervention (drawing on the implicit and explicit interpretation of various UN Security Council resolutions, including the negotiating history) are (I am assured) respectable and solid.

In other words, Michael Wood and Elizabeth Wilmshurst did not serve themselves or us well by sniffily dismissing them when they gave evidence. Their blunt analysis of the justifications for military action did not do justice to a lot of real-life operational nuances, and struck an oddly absolutist tone in terms of what lawyers are properly meant to do (and often do do) in these situations.

Second, Elizabeth Wilmshurst won some nice populist praise for herself by saying when she closed her evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry that the process leading up to the Iraq intervention had been "lamentable".

This does not wash. She and Michael Wood were the process.

Michael Wood’s statement to the Inquiry concludes (my emphasis) with some important words:

35. The lesson I would draw is that on matters such as this it is important that Ministers seek legal advice, where necessary from the Attorney General, in a timely manner. Where the use of force is under consideration, this probably means throughout the process of policy formation.

Basically, it is not up to the AG to give a view without being invited to do so. And it is not up to Ministers alone to seek such advice – the FCO Legal Advisers themselves are well placed to do just that.

In this case it is not clear from what Michael Wood said in his evidence just why the FCO lawyers, seeing a dangerous and problematic situation hurtling towards them, did not formally ask the AG for a view and insist that he give one at an early enough stage. Copying various memos to the AG’s office is not the same as asking for a view.

Michael’s own evidence – see the transcript at p 40 – is elusive on this vital point, and unfortunately the Inquiry did not drill down quite deep enough to find out what was going on between the key lawyers involved. 

Back to the Big Picture.

Here is Stephen Glover railing against assorted timid and self-serving mandarins:

Ms Wilmshurst’s resignation caused tremors. Had Sir Michael gone too, and other senior servants followed suit, the dishonesty and manipulation of the Government would have been exposed.

I know, I know. Politicians are elected, civil servants are not. We can’t have civil servants bringing down a government every time they disagree with it.

But if intelligence chiefs realised that Tony Blair was wilfully exaggerating the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and if Foreign Office mandarins knew the Government was exerting pressure so as to get the war declared legal, weren’t they duty bound to bring such constitutional abuses to the notice of their fellow citizens?

Tendentious though his article of course is, it does hit some important issues at the heart of the ethics of public life in a democracy.

When does a hard decision tip over into becoming a ‘constitutional abuse’? Who decides? When should civil servants closely involved in supporting a fairly elected government decide that enough is enough, and either resign or try to block a policy pursued by Ministers?

Maybe this is a no-brainer: when that policy looks likely to lead to a war which has at best uncertain legal cover?

But what about the wider aspects? Is it really so wrong to be part of a policy process which intervenes to topple a murderous leader who has killed and tortured on a world-class scale, and who has defied international law so determinedly for so long? William Shawcross:

Despite the continuing vicious attacks of suicide bombers, Iraq is now bravely inching towards a much more open society. Indeed, on many measures it is one of the freest countries in the Arab world.

Michael Wood’s statement again:

36. Another issue is the strength of the legal case that should be required before the Government goes to war. Is a ‘reasonable’ legal case sufficient? A ‘respectable’ case? An ‘arguable’ case? Or should there be a higher degree of legal certainty? This is ultimately a policy question, and one that perhaps cannot be answered in the abstract.

Which is indeed why the evidence given by Michael/Elizabeth suggesting that in fact the issue was clear-cut against intervention is, ultimately, not satisfactory.

And why the claim that there was a constitutional abuse in this case is not as simple as its vociferous proponents say. Not to forget that both in the House of Commons and at the ballot-box the Blair policy was endorsed by clear majorities.

All of which said, would some sort of Cosmic Supreme Judge, invited in by Earth to give a view on these issues, look at the clever legal arguments used by Tony Blair and the AG and pronounce that they fall into the category of Nice Try – but not Enough?

Perhaps.

Perhaps too that Judge would go on to say that even though the carry-through of the policy was flawed, the moral case for ending the Saddam regime and giving Iraq some chance of a decent future was a powerful mitigating circumstance?