In case you haven’t seen it already, here is my latest DIPLOMAT article – this one on the flawed first principles underlying the EU’s current problems.

It considers several basic principles of the way the EU works and notes that the current crisis is so painful because it is putting these ‘deeper’ principles under severe strain:

Carefully Calibrated Paternalism

All Europeans are equal. But some are a lot more equal than others…

Indeed, you must add together the populations of Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland, Finland, Slovakia, Denmark, Bulgaria, Austria, Sweden, Hungary, Czech Republic and Belgium to amass a population total exceeding Germany’s. These countries combined get 124 votes, compared to the puny 29 that Germany, UK, France and Italy each enjoy.

What this means is that the EU Bigs – and especially Germany – have gone far out of their way to make themselves non-threatening to the EU Smalls. They do this by denying themselves the full voting weight their population numbers would receive if voting were decided according to a straight headcount of each member state’s citizens. Without this far-reaching modesty by the Bigs, they could combine forces to win any vote. The Smalls would always lose. Which, if you’re a Small, isn’t fair.

However, the fact that the Bigs give such generous voting weight to Smalls (and Not-So-Smalls) is patronising or at least paternalistic. It tells the Smalls that they are, well, small – and living off the political munificence of the Bigs. As Prince Hal ruefully puts it in Henry IV, Part One when mixing with Falstaff and the other vagabonds, ‘I know you all, and will awhile uphold the unyok’d humour of your idleness.’

Highly Qualified Trust

Should Europeans trust each other? Of course. Do they? Not so much. One strikingly positive example of European Trust lies in that very fact of voting at the EU level. Each EU member state, Big and Small alike, has surrendered goodly dollops of sovereignty to Brussels, to the point of accepting that it might get outvoted on all sorts of issues with direct implications for its own citizens. This concession is made by all in return for ‘getting things done’ by the Union as a whole, where the things which get done are, by definition, in the wider EU family interest.

Thus each state assumes a minimal level of reasonableness and good faith on the part of any voting majority, a remarkable and (as events now suggest) unwise innovation in international diplomatic practice. But this is not the whole story.

Any small community, much like a family, works through informal give-and-take understandings rather than rules: the ambient level of familiarity and trust is high. The larger the community, the greater the need for formal rules, and then even more rules: familiarity and mutual trust are that much lower.

This explains why despite all the lofty rhetoric about European unity and shared values, the Union rests on incredibly complicated and impenetrable treaties, given life by incredibly complicated and impenetrable ‘directives’. Cultural-political values and practices inevitably differ hugely across so many different countries. It is difficult to make the space work without spelling out each and every detail to avoid ambiguity and disagreement (and corruption).

Asymmetric Solidarity

No Europeans talk more about ‘solidarity’ than the Poles. Not surprisingly – the red Solidarnosc (Solidarity) logo designed by Jerzy Janiszewski helped mobilise the Polish nation against communism and became one of history’s finest political icons. Having joined the Union in 2004 the Poles now vigorously wave the ‘European solidarity’ banner. This mainly means that other EU member states should go along with whatever Poland wants, especially where the Union’s money is concerned.

A wider collectivist idea of solidarity underpins ‘social Europe’: we are all in the same European boat together, so ipso facto we must share similar beliefs and values, plus the richer areas of Europe should help the poorer areas.

The problem with such solidarity is that it risks ending up being a one-way redistributive street. If the rich should help the poor (as they have massively done through EU Cohesion Funds and other redistributive mechanisms), what should the poor do in return? Work harder? Agree to refuse assistance when they have improved their lot? Stick to the rules meticulously? Be grateful?

No-one knows. Or even wants to put the question. In fact, even mentioning this question suggests a selfish, indecent, un-European lack of solidarity. Shame on me…