Former FCO Minister Denis MacShane MP has written a small but energetic book praising Kosovo’s independence: Why Kosovo Still Matters (sic).
Here it is, a perfect Christmas stocking-filler, the more perfect if bought via this link so that I get a few groats from Amazon:
The main interest of the book for you folk lies in the more or less contemporaneous Ministerial diary extracts from Denis as he visited various Balkan capitals and attended international gatherings where Kosovo/Serbia was being discussed.
There is a walk-on role by Keith Vaz MP, briefly the Minister responsible for Balkan policy, whose modest knowledge of the subject was exposed back in 2001 when he and I had to give evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee:
We find it deeply regrettable that Mr Vaz, the FCO minister responsible for south-east Europe, has not visited the area … His evidence session with us did not reveal a detailed grasp of the policy issues which the area faces. As the Minister told us, and we know ourselves, the situation in the Balkans is "very complex and very difficult"…
It has to be said that the Committee had a point.
Mr Vaz’s eloquent but somewhat insubstantial replies to their many questions were a truly fine example of talking a lot and saying … nothing.
In Denis’ book too Keith Vaz blandly reveals his insightful approach. During a session of briefing by FCO officials on the complexity of the Kosovo problem, he asks:
"Can somebody just draw me a little map and show me where Kosovo is?"
The main interest of the book for me is … me. I appear wittily or not at various points, but this line caught my special eye:
"… Charles Crawford, one of the most whizzing catherine wheels of a politically astute ambassador that we have"
*blushes prettily*
The book also records accurately enough one amazing moment in April 2002 when then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw chaired a discussion about Balkan policy.
Paddy Ashdown (then High Representative in Bosnia) had nobbled PM Tony Blair to argue against drawing down UK forces too far in Bosnia while maintaining a sizeable UK military presence in Kosovo. The Foreign Secretary asked officials where we all thought the main UK military effort should now focus:
Charles Crawford, the sharp but rather cocky Ambassador in Belgrade, says that we should stay in Bosnia and that Kosovo should be persuaded to stay in a loose federation with Serbia and Montenegro.
The arguments about where UK troops made most impact on the ground and where the main threat to the region’s security lay went round and round the table. Finally, as he describes in the book, Denis proposed a vote. And before anyone could question his sanity he quickly had torn up a piece of paper and handed round slips for voting: B for Bosnia, K for Kosovo.
We voted. The votes were counted by Denis. 10 – 5 for focusing on Kosovo. I voted for a heavier UK military presence in Kosovo (of course), even though the book suggests that the opposite was my view.
Denis’ case therefore won the argument:
Thus, British foreign policy is made
Hmm. The exception, not the rule, I think.
Otherwise the text is a gay romp through the politics of the Balkans over a thousand years and the latest decades of convulsion, with no opportunity spared to extol the Kosovans and cast Serbs in general and most UK Conservatives in particular in a bad light.
In other words, a typical MacShanian production. Top quality insider gossip, lively, sometimes irreverent, impossibly light, blithely tendentious. And with handy insights. I especially liked the way he linked the events in 1980s’ Yugoslavia to the Solidarity pressures in Poland – important to recall that there was a wider European anti-communist context to the issue.
It’s also noteworthy that he does not (now) dismiss out of hand the idea of some sort of small territory swaps as part of an historic deal between Belgrade and Pristina, an idea whose time may yet come.
The main problem with the book, apart from myriad other problems, is that it does far too little justice (in fact none at all) to the significant arguments of the Russians and others about the inadmissibility of border changes in Europe "without the consent of all concerned" as per the Helsinki Accords.
Because, Minister, foreign policy is all about balancing realities against principles and rules.
And for all the merits of the Kosovans’ claims against Belgrade, is it really such a good outcome for the UK and the world – and even for Kosovo – that international opinion has ended up so divided in a way which shows that deeper Western policy on this subject has spectacularly failed to be convincing (ie Russia, China, India, Brazil, S Africa and many other non-Western big hitters firmly not recognising Kosovo independence on principle)?
Anyway, did I say buy it via the Amazon link above? Go on. You know you want to.
But better not if you’re a Serb.