A gush of media reporting on the start of the conflict in Bosnia back in 1992.

This one by Tim Judah (who knows his Balkans) is smart but maybe too optimistic. Yes, the likelihood of horrible inter-ethnic fighting has subsided. But is what we have now really good enough and, in some sense that matters, stable and sustainable? And does it help to mention Scotland’s ideas about independence in a pasage about Republika Srpska? Still, he makes some good points about the utterly changed regional and European context:

Another counterweight to the teary 20-years-on stories of last week is the altered regional context, which many foreign journalists returning to Sarajevo for the anniversary overlooked. The European Union has its troubles for sure, but the accession process makes for a clear goal to work toward, limits the extremes of political discourse and gives officials thousands of generally good and useful things to do to make their countries better places. If EU entry criteria had been as demanding in the late 1970s and early 1980s as they are today, Greece might not be in the mess it’s in.

Update: For a gloomier view, try this one by Matthew Parish which comes down on the side of the argument that favours unending inter-ethnic antagonisms:

The ethno-nationalist politicians of which foreign diplomats have grown so exhausted talking about are the product of ethno-nationalist self-partition on the part of three groups of people all of whom have been scarred by their wartime experiences. Fear and animosity drive Bosnians’ formidable determination not to reintegrate, even when the legal opportunities for them to do so exist.

For the Western policymaker, the depth to which ethnic intransigence has permeated the mindset of the general population represents a challenge to the liberal values that they would like to see Bosnia embrace as it embarks on a smooth course towards European Union membership…

Hmm. ‘Liberal’ values in that part of the world? Not easy to identify. Remember our old friend the Sakic-Milosevic Syndrome? Thus:

As I used to tell anyone who would listen in Belgrade, "Serbia has two problems. First, you have an image problem. And second, you don’t know you have an image problem."

Or is it even worse that that?

"We know that we have an image problem. And we just don’t care any more. Is that a problem? And if so, is it our problem – or your problem?"

On the immediate origins of the war, read this fascinating piece by Bosnian journalist Nenad Pejic about the problems local TV faced in covering a large ‘march for peace’ in Sarajevo in April 1992, on the eve of the start of the real fighting. He even managed to get the key political leaders into the TV studio in a dramatic attempt to head off war by agreeing a political settlement:

Never in my life have I witnessed negotiations that were so important and were being conducted by individuals that were so irresponsible. Their bigotry, verbal traps, accusations, threats, and half-truths were appalling. They immediately dived into accusing and attacking each other while hundreds of thousands of citizens demanded peace on the streets of Sarajevo.

At one point Karadzic wanted to leave the studio. Believe it or not, I held him by his suit as he stood up from the chair. Shortly afterward, Izetbegovic, who was on my other side, wanted to leave as well, so I grabbed him too. I held onto their suit jackets and implored them not to leave. By this point, their security details were on full alert and, like faithful dogs, they were ready to defend their masters. But both Karadzic and Izetbegovic sat down and my sweaty palms released their suit jackets, leaving a little wrinkle on each.

I do not possess a transcript of the negotiations, but at one point General Kukanjac said: “ So Mr. Izetbegovic, do you agree that JNA troops should be stationed around Sarajevo, to protect the peace and prevent the escalation of the conflict to the rest of the country?” The comment was detached from reality as the war had already been waged outside the capital, but Izetbegovic responded, “You always do what you want to do anyway, so what’s the point.” The general was looking to legalize the siege of Sarajevo and was delighted. “I will take this as a sign of your approval. The orders will be given accordingly,” he said. And indeed, the city was protected from receiving humanitarian aid, food, and medical supplies for the next four years…

Point by point, four heads in the studio nodded slowly, and officially the negotiations had ended. The politicians left with their army of bodyguards. “You did a great thing for your country, sir,” the EU representative said to me afterward. Unfortunately I didn’t share his illusion. ”Actually I haven’t. As soon as they leave the building they will ruin everything,” I said.

And they did.

Finally, if you don’t read Serbo-Bosnian and you can lay your hands on Google translator read this long 2008 interview with the legendary Serb from Bosnia, Bogic Bogicevic. He was a member of the Yugoslavia national eight-man collective Presidency, but elected as the Bosnia and Herzegovina representative on something like a democratic mandate. He (in)famously found himself in an appalling situation when Milosevic expected him as a ‘loyal Serb’ to go along with Belgrade’s plan of how constitutional events should unfold. But he voted with his conscience and voted No.

This amazing, tense episode was filmed, and later shown in the Death of Yugoslavia film series. Here it is:

You may be wondering why the Presidency members were wearing coats indoors. As Bogicevic explains in his interview, the Jugoslav Army took the Presidency members (without consulting them) off to a very cold room in the deep basement of a military building (no doubt to add to the psychological pressure on those thought likely to vote No, not least Bogicevic himself).

I was in London grappling with the collapse of the USSR while all this was happening. So I have no real sense for the intricacies of the local rival political options in Bosnia and elsewhere in the doomed SFRY as the country slumped into conflict. When precisely did it all go wrong, and when precisely should Western governments have been better/smarter at delivering threats or offering bribes to head off war? Views differ.

The Serbs do make one strong point about what happened in Bosnia back then, namely that the Bosnia independence referendum decision supported by the Muslims/Bosniacs and Croats was pushed through illegally under the laws on collective decision-making then pertaining.

I wonder how far this in fact matters. Maybe Milosevic and Croatian leader Tudjman were planning to carve up Bosnia anyway? But was it wise to push for independence as Izetbegovic when as much as one third of the republic’s population were strenuously opposed to it?

Yes, an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina is now a member of the United Nations, with hopes of eventual EU membership. It perhaps is, as Tim Judah says, a ‘glass half-full’. But was the cost of getting there so high for such a small territory as to leave the country effectively dysfunctional for the indefinite future?