My observations on Power and Purpose attracted this interesting thought from someone in the Mini containing my ever-growing army of readers, himself once closely involved in British government sharp-end business:

It always struck me that the FCO was truly excellent when faced with a bad situation. They could be relied on to negotiate a solution that was pretty good in the circumstances – probably far better than the UK deserved. 

It was when the situation was not bad that problems arose – when there was (initially) the possibility of a genuinely good outcome with no need for compromise by the UK. It was almost as if that possibility were automatically discounted, with the diplomats eagerly throwing away our advantages so as to get into their comfort zone, which (as one would have thought it) was paradoxically the uncomfortable area of tough hand to hand negotiation on a fiercely-contested diplomatic battlefield. 

In due course, the good-solution-in-the-circumstances would be achieved – but not the excellent solution that was once a real possibility.

A deep point is made here, not so much about our policies but our instincts. What do we think negotiation is actually trying to achieve? And how determined are we to get our way?

One rather bland view has it that the Aims of Political Negotiation are (a) to maximise interests and (b) to reach agreement.

But surely the Aim is to get what you want, or as damn close to it as possible: agreement now may be the best outcome, or not – Life Goes On.

It’s all as Lenin said: Who (does what to) Whom?

  • Can you inflict Pain/Cost on them?
  • Can they inflict Pain/Cost on you?
  • Can you define the bottom line by blocking a deal everyone else wants?
  • Can someone else block a deal you want? What will you pay to avoid that?

Perhaps the most striking example of Blocking around these days is the Greece’s utter (and to non-Greeks utterly baffling) intransigence on the name of its neighbour Macedonia (or Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as it is ‘provisionally known).

Greece somehow has decided that if Macedonia were allowed to call itself Macedonia that would amount to endorsing certain teritorial ambitions towards Greek territory. So Greece is cheerily blocking significant European/NATO integration processes involving Macedonia on this basis.

And they succeed. Seemingly no-one wants to inflict real pain on Greece to change its cost-benefit analysis.

Tail wags dog. Macedonia loses.

All this helps explain why the EU works the way it does. You have Power only if you can block. Hence readiness to have Voting on ever more issues rather than Consensus, "to get things done".

See also the Mother of All Blockings, the right of veto for the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. Once that right is there it does not need to be used often. As Nimzowitsch (maybe) said, "the threat is stronger than the execution."

Whatever. It boils down to a simple proposition.

How bloody-minded are you ready to be to get what you want, via negotiation or otherwise?

If the answer is ‘not very’, do not be surprised if others more bloody-minded than you get more of what they want – at your expense.

See France and Greece in the EU, passim