And now, a new UK enquiry into the history of the Iraq intervention.

Craig Murray is rude about the Chilcot enquiry team, including my former boss Rod Lyne. I myself find it hard to understand why an official who had a senior job in selling UK policy during this period has been given a prominent role in scrutinising it now.

But as Anne McElvoy points out (quoting some or other former Ambassador) the best potential evidence may lie in the memories of the private secretaries in Downing Street and the Foreign Office. "They knew everything," he says, "but strangely, they are never called to give an account."

Good point.

Unlike Craig or indeed myself Rod has served as Private Secretary at Number 10 and knows how things work at that level, so he can ask some penetrating questions if he wants to do so.

The Guardian live blog of the enquiry is well done. Have a look at this account of Sir C Meyer’s evidence today.

Meyer being smart and studiously provocative adds some context, namely that ‘regime change’ in Iraq was not something dreamed up by President Bush but rather a clear policy inherited from President Clinton. He also gives a view that Mrs Thatcher would have driven a harder bargain with the Americans as a condition for UK support. Bracing stuff, and true.

Will Chilcot come to call victims of Saddam’s torture chambers to testify on the moral case for the intervention? Craig Murray rails against what he says is the wickedness of Western ‘complicity’ in deal with torture-wielding despots, but never quite seems to offer a credible policy on what actually might be done to get rid of them and end the torture.

There are really only four questions this and any enquiry on the subject needs to answer:

Was the intervention legal?

Could it be justified in principle and practice under international law?

Was the intervention technically doable?

Were the right tools for the job available and how indeed was the job defined? (NB in Iraq’s case the follow-up on the ground after the toppling of Saddam appears to be a major failing, as was the ill-judged focus on the WMD arguments at HMG’s insistence)

Was the intervention – all things considered – wise?

Even if the intervention was done well and in principle doable, was it likely to bring about positive results? This question is really about timescale, and as Iraq gets into its stride as a free country again things may look more positive on this front. No doubt Tony Blair’s main argument for his policy will be here.

Was the intervention in fact done well?

The global and domestic public can tolerate some ambiguity in the legal case and the planning of an intervention, plus may cut politicians some slack on the wisdom/timescale issue. But people are usually unforgiving when they sense that the job has been bungled for one reason or another. As already noted, the lack of detailed planning on how Iraq should be run after Saddam was toppled was a clear mistake emanating from the Bush team, and much of the ensuing controversy – and ghastly violence – stemmed from that.

To be continued…