Reader Willie Garvin asks (via my previous post):

How many of the 47 states that have recognised Kosovo as independent have done so for reasons other that the belief it was the right thing to do for the region and international relations in general?  I mean, how many Croatias are there that opted for recognition as an attempt to prove to the EU what a jolly good candidate/member they are? 

Well, let’s see.

This site looks to be a pretty up-to-date list of where Kosovo stands in international recognition terms.

It says that 47 countries (out of 192 UN members) have recognised Kosovo as an indepenendent new state.

The countries from outside Europe are Costa Rica; USA; Afghanistan; Senegal; Peru; Japan; Canada; S Korea; Marshall Islands; Nauru; Burkina Faso; Liberia; Sierre Leone; Belize; Colombia; and Samoa. And Turkey, insofar as that it is both in and not in ‘Europe’.

According to my maths that is fewer than twenty of the world’s non-European countries.

To answer the question, only Croatia looks to be a country which some people might suspect has recognised Kosovo to be ‘in’ with the EU as an eventual member. Turkey too maybe, or maybe not – there is a Turkish-speaking minority in Kosovo which might have influenced Ankara’s decision.

Macedonia and Montenegro are wavering. Both have an Albanian-speaking minority and a Slavic majority, so the issue is fraught with sensitivities domestically. Given the scale of Russian money in Montenegro, Moscow’s views must weigh heavily in Podgorica. Hence too the deathly hush from CIS countries with EU aspirations of different sorts.

All in all, this outcome is a really big punch on the nose for ‘Western’ policy. Serbia can feel quite comfortable pushing ahead at the UN with its call for an ICJ advisory opinion – plenty of global big hitters think that Serbia has a fair point, whatever most EU countries and Washington might think.

On a related theme.

The Kosovo precedent (or not) has been grabbed by Russia for its own purposes in carving away S Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia.

But why did Russia go so far in intervening in that situation actually to recognise these two tiny territories as independent? Surely Moscow knew that almost literally no-one else would do so?

Here is an interesting analysis by Georgia’s fomer Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili.

She points out that indeed not even a single CIS ally (not even Belarus) has recognised these two territories’ independence. So was the Russian move a fatuous blunder?

Perhaps not:

There is, however, an alternative explanation: that Moscow anticipated those negative reactions from its neighbors and partners and acted knowingly. Having bombed Georgia (as NATO bombed Serbia in 1999), and having formally recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as the West recognized Kosovo earlier this year), Russia sought to draw a line under these two "precedents" in order to rally everyone around the idea that these two symmetrical exceptions should not be repeated anywhere else.

Consolidating this exceptionality would suit Moscow well by making it into the ultimate backer of the principle of territorial integrity. This hypothesis could explain why Moscow did not exert much pressure on its closest allies to back its decision.

What ensued could then stand out as a well planned and calculated strategy of killing two birds with one stone: inflicting the maximum damage on Georgia, while upholding the principle of territorial integrity. Such a move would please Turkey and other European countries that have felt threatened by the implications of Moscow’s decision.

I think that there is something in this. Russia likes ‘symmetry’ in its dealings with Wasington.So maybe Russia is saying to Washington

"Look, your Kosovo policy is a fatuous flop. Look what happens elsewhere with such silly ad hoc independence decisions. Let’s do this nicely. Together. Which means we listen to you – and you listen to us. OK? Oh, and by the way we have a huge majority of countries on our side this time…"

Diplomacy is sometimes quite interesting from a psychological point of view.