Here is my latest Telegraph blog piece, this time on the dilemmas in negotiating with a country such as North Korea where the usual options of Persuasion, Carrot or Stick seem to make little impact:

Many humans (and even some governments) aren’t donkeys. So another layer of analysis applies. As we saw in the Vietnam war, it was not only about the size of the heavy US bombing stick. The communist Vietnamese offered another challenge. In effect they told Washington that they would tolerate more pain than the Americans were ready to impose. They were, in a word, tougher. Of course it’s easier to present a tough face to the world when you do not have to grapple with domestic public opinion or forthcoming elections. Nonetheless they were indeed very tough. And duly won.

So to North Korea. Unlike Syria which is in some sense a ‘normal’ part of the international community and therefore more vulnerable to sanctions and the annoyance of its neighbours, North Korea is largely impervious to threats. Its puny trade is mainly with Asian partners (notably China) that won’t impose sanctions. Plus the South Korean capital is within close range of an obliterating attack.

Hence Washington – under any management – oscillates unhappily between a policy of ‘engagement’ and ‘isolation’. When the cycle calls for ‘engagement’ the best available carrot is food aid linked to some sort of bilateral process where available. When the cycle calls for isolation because the North Koreans won’t cooperate, all that stops and looks lame: there are few if any meaningful sticks. As now. Round and round it goes.

This line in the Guardian piece caught my eye:

One of Obama’s deputy national security advisers, Ben Rhodes, denied that the administration’s dealings with North Korea have been a failure. He argued that the president has taken a tougher stand with Pyongyang than the Bush administration because Washington will not now deliver the promised food aid … Asked if it is proper to leave ordinary North Koreans to go hungry or even starve because the actions of their government, Rhodes said that it is the regime in Pyongyang "that is holding its own people hostage".

This is a really hard dilemma in foreign policy. Do we treat the victims of evil regimes as people we ought to help, come what may? Or let them suffer in the hope that they themselves will rise up and end their agony? (See eg Syria.)

If we send in food aid to North Korea, the regime will be strengthened. If we don’t, more people die. The psychological game played by the North Korean regime here is implacably cruel. They are hoping that we care more for North Korean people than they do.

Sometimes we do care, sometimes we don’t. Either way the regime there does not lose.

Of course the West’s real negotiation here is with China and (to a lesser degree Russia). The Chinese leadership probably despise the North Koreans, but insist that any change there happens only on Chinese terms. Which tends to mean that the harder the West/USA presses for change, the more the Chinese will find ways to thwart it, just to show how tough and smart they are.

Quite what will happen if one day the North Koreans rise up against the regime and bring the place crashing down remains to be seen: will Beijing end up looking ridiculous for backing such losers, or simply use its economic muscle to pile in and assert some sort of new control?

When I was in Moscow I met a Russian diplomat who had had only three overseas postings – all in North Korea! That’s Russian diplomatic specialisation for you. He looked very worn down by the experience